Optimal mechanisms for agents with multi-dimensional preferences are generally complex. This complexity makes them challenging to solve for and impractical to run. In a typical mechanism design approach, a model is posited and then the optimal mechanism is designed for the model. Successful mechanism design gives mechanisms that one could at least imagine running. By this measure, multi-dimensional mechanism design has had only limited success. In this paper we take the opposite approach, which we term reverse mechanism design. We start by hypothesizing the optimality of a particular form of mechanism that is simple and reasonable to run, then we solve for sufficient conditions for the mechanism to be optimal (among all mechanisms). This paper has two main contributions. The first is in codifying the method of virtual values from single-dimensional auction theory and extending it to agents with multidimensional preferences. The second is in applying this method to two paradigmatic classes of multi-dimensional preferences. The first class is unit-demand preferences (e.g., a homebuyer who wishes to buy at most one house); for this class we give sufficient conditions under which posting a uniform price for each item is optimal. This result generalizes one of Alaei et al. ] where uniform pricing is not optimal. The second class is additive preferences, for this class we give sufficient conditions under which posting a price for the grand bundle is optimal. This result generalizes a recent result of Hart and Nisan [2012] and relates to work of Armstrong [1999]. Similarly to an approach of Alaei et al. [2013] , these results for single-agent pricing problems can be generalized naturally to multi-agent auction problems.
Optimal mechanisms for agents with multi-dimensional preferences are generally complex. This complexity makes them challenging to solve for and impractical to run. In a typical mechanism design approach, a model is posited and then the optimal mechanism is designed for the model. Successful mechanism design gives mechanisms that one could at least imagine running. By this measure, multi-dimensional mechanism design has had only limited success. In this paper we take the opposite approach, which we term reverse mechanism design. We start by hypothesizing the optimality of a particular form of mechanism that is simple and reasonable to run, then we solve for sufficient conditions for the mechanism to be optimal (among all mechanisms). This paper has two main contributions. The first is in codifying the method of virtual values from single-dimensional auction theory and extending it to agents with multidimensional preferences. The second is in applying this method to two paradigmatic classes of multi-dimensional preferences. The first class is unit-demand preferences (e.g., a homebuyer who wishes to buy at most one house); for this class we give sufficient conditions under which posting a uniform price for each item is optimal. This result generalizes one of Alaei et al. [2013] for a consumer with values uniform on interval [0, 1], and contrasts with an example of Thanassoulis [2004] for a consumer with values uniform on interval [5, 6] where uniform pricing is not optimal. The second class is additive preferences, for this class we give sufficient conditions under which posting a price for the grand bundle is optimal. This result generalizes a recent result of Hart and Nisan [2012] and relates to work of Armstrong [1999] . Similarly to an approach of Alaei et al. [2013] , these results for single-agent pricing problems can be generalized naturally to multi-agent auction problems.
Approach: Solving for Multi-dimensional Virtual Values. The characterization of revenue-optimal auctions for single-dimensional agents follows from the design of virtual values that satisfy two properties [Myerson 1981 ]. First, the pointwise optimization of virtual surplus must give an allocation rule that is incentive compatible. Second, the virtual values must be an amortization of revenue, i.e., the expected the virtual surplus of any incentive compatible mechanism is equal to the expected revenue of that mechanism.
With general preferences, if a virtual value function that satisfies the incentive compatibility and amortization conditions can be identified then the optimal mechanism design problem is solved. Integration by parts can be used on paths connecting each type to the origin to obtain an amortization. For agents with single-dimensional preferences, uniqueness of such paths results in a unique amortization. It then remains to check the incentive compatibility property, i.e., that pointwise optimization of virtual surplus is incentive compatible; by standard characterizations of incentive compatible mechanisms, this is a simple task as well. Integration by parts can be used in higher dimensions as well to derive amortizations, parameterized by a consistent choice of paths connecting each point in the type space to the origin. However, not all choices of consistent paths give an amortization that also satisfy the incentive compatibility requirements. The challenge is to find the right choice of paths, such that pointwise optimization of resulting virtual welfare gives an incentive compatible mechanism. This difficulty has prevented the design of mechanisms for multi-dimensional agents that follows the virtual-value-based approach (see Hart and Reny [2014] for a comprehensive discussion).
To resolve the non-uniqueness of functions that satisfy the amortization property we consider additional constraints that the optimality of the hypothesized mechanism would place on virtual values. These additional constraints reduce a degree of freedom in the integration by parts and result in a unique amortization. From this amortization, optimality of the hypothesized mechanism (and thus, incentive compatibility) can be checked.
Example: Pricing with Delay. Consider selling an item for immediate delivery, delayed delivery (e.g., by express mail or standard mail), or lotteries thereof. The buyer's has a private value v for receiving the item immediately and, and a private discount factor δ ≤ 1, resulting in value v × δ for delayed receipt of the item. A direct application of one of our main theorems states that uniform pricing is optimal when δ and v are positively correlated and the marginal distribution of v is regular. Our correlation condition requires that the conditional distribution of δ for any v is first order stochastically dominated by the conditional distribution of δ for v ≥ v. Furthermore, the regularity assumption can be relaxed if a slightly more restrictive form of positive correlation is satisfied.
